When the EU and the US announced a tariff framework on 27 July 2025, markets and management teams largely interpreted it as a de-escalation moment: a trade war avoided, a headline rate established, and at least some planning certainty restored.
That optimism is understandable – but incomplete. High-level frameworks tend to create a new baseline while leaving the most operationally consequential questions unresolved. In this case, analysis of the agreement points to a familiar pattern: a simple number (15%) masking a complex implementation reality – with outcomes likely to vary sharply by product classification, supply-chain design, and the political durability of the deal itself.
What appears clear – and why it still changes the economics
The framework sets a 15% tariff rate on EU imports into the US, which is materially below some of the figures that had been circulating, but still meaningfully above the late-2024 baseline for many goods. A number of sectors and products are described as remaining zero-tariff in both directions, while US imports into the EU are not described as facing new tariff increases, and EU retaliation threats were withdrawn in the immediate framing of the deal.
For many companies, the immediate implication is not “small change.” A 15% landing rate, applied at scale, quickly becomes a structural cost that reshapes margin waterfalls, pricing posture, and channel strategy. It also changes the internal conversation: tariff exposure moves from being a scenario-planning topic to a recurring operating variable – something that must be embedded in quoting, contracting, and demand planning.
Why the “auto example” matters beyond autos
One of the most revealing elements is the treatment of autos and auto parts. The framework’s 15% rate is positioned as replacing higher duties already in effect for that category, and the broader discussion highlights how a bilateral adjustment can create competitive distortions across countries and supply chains.
The deeper lesson for internationalisation teams is that tariff changes rarely affect one product line in isolation. They ripple into:
- relative competitiveness (who is advantaged vs. disadvantaged by the new rate),
- component strategies (where parts are sourced and how origin is determined),
- commercial terms (who absorbs the tariff and how price escalators are designed).
That ripple effect is exactly why “country entry” and “trade exposure” are now inseparable topics in expansion planning.
Where the uncertainty sits: “15%” is not the same as “15% for everyone”
Ceiling or stack? The single biggest technical ambiguity
A core uncertainty flagged in early analysis is whether the 15% rate is a true ceiling or whether it could stack on top of baseline duties (depending on interpretation and product category). For operating teams, that’s not legal trivia – it’s the difference between a manageable uplift and an unexpected margin shock.
This is one reason why tariff forecasting at the “average rate” level often fails. The planning unit has to shift down to HS code reality, where small classification differences can produce different outcomes.
Sector gaps are strategically meaningful
Even where sectors are described as exempt or kept at zero tariffs, early commentary notes that the precise HS codes covered are not always specified in the framework-level articulation. That creates a practical risk: companies can believe they sit inside an “exempt sector,” only to find that the exemptions map to a narrower set of subcategories than expected.
Similarly, the framework discussion highlights unresolved treatment for certain products (for example, how specific categories such as pharmaceuticals are ultimately handled), reinforcing that the commercial outcome will depend on details that are still subject to interpretation and negotiation.
Steel and aluminium illustrate how “frameworks” coexist with legacy measures
The analysis also points to categories (such as steel and aluminium) that remain subject to separate duties pending further arrangements, emphasizing that a “deal” can coexist with other tariff instruments and carve-outs that matter enormously for industrial supply chains.
For internationalisers, this is the operational takeaway: headline clarity does not eliminate perimeter complexity. Companies should assume a patchwork, not a single rule.
Why this agreement fits a larger shift: the patchwork trade order is becoming the default
Trade-policy analysis in 2025 increasingly argued that the prior multilateral baseline (with lower complexity) is giving way to a world of shorter framework deals, bilateral rate-setting, and country-specific implementation schemes – with uncertainty persisting for the foreseeable future.
The EU–US framework also illustrates a legal/structural point: it is described as not resembling a comprehensive free trade agreement under the traditional multilateral model, and the broader expectation is that more deals of this “framework” nature may multiply, increasing complexity rather than reducing it.
This matters for internationalisation because it changes what “global scale” requires. The capability shift is from optimising one global supply chain to managing multiple compliant supply chains – and being able to pivot between them without breaking service levels or commercial commitments.
What companies should do now: move from “tariff awareness” to “tariff operating model”
The best responses tend to be less about one heroic re-pricing exercise and more about building a repeatable capability. The following actions are consistently recommended in trade-impact playbooks:
Rebuild the economics at the level where tariffs are actually applied
Companies benefit from running a targeted, company-level assessment that ties together:
- HS code and origin logic
- bill-of-materials structure and intercompany flows
- lane-level exposure (EU→US, US→EU, and indirect dependencies)
- contract terms (Incoterms, pass-through clauses, and renewal timing)
Early frameworks can leave room for interpretation; the only defensible posture is to know exactly which parts of the portfolio are exposed and which are not.
Redesign sourcing and footprint decisions with “trade resilience” as a first-order constraint
Where tariffs are now a durable baseline, mitigation usually requires a portfolio of levers: supplier shifts, dual sourcing, manufacturing/assembly reconfiguration, and commercial redesign (pricing architecture and channel mix). The correct answer depends on the company’s specific structure – there is no universal playbook – but the direction is consistent: cost structures, sourcing, and pricing need to be revisited against the new baseline.
Stand up a cross-functional “tariff command centre”
Leading organizations increasingly treat tariffs as an always-on management discipline – connecting trade compliance, supply chain, finance, and commercial teams into one operating cadence. This is often framed as a “command centre” model to manage compliance execution, scenario planning, and fast decisions as details evolve.
Plan for second-order effects – even if direct exposure is limited
Even firms not directly shipping across the EU–US lane can be affected if tariffs shift competitor pricing, alter input costs, or redirect global supply and capacity. That’s why scenario planning needs to include competitiveness and market-share effects, not only landed cost.
The bottom line for internationalisation leaders
The EU–US framework reduces one kind of uncertainty (the fear of an immediate tariff spiral) while increasing another (the operational ambiguity that follows from high-level frameworks with unresolved definitions, exclusions, and durability questions).
In 2026, internationalisation plans that assume stable trade rules will increasingly underperform. The more resilient approach is to treat trade policy as a design input – building classification precision, scenario readiness, and footprint flexibility into expansion strategies from the start.
